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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
1 :,v. - ..... v o./n v>i /vj.pca.o im ictioninthis matter pursuant to §78-2a-
3-: . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in considering the intent or purpose of a fence as 
determinateive in its determination that there was no boundary by 
acquiescence. 
Standard of Review: The District Court's determination of law is reviewed for 
correctness and no deference is granted to the District Court. James v. Galetka. 965 P.2d 
567(UtaApp. 1998). 
2. Did the District Court err in law by concluding that the Plaintiff/Appellant 
must prove that there was uncertainty or dispute as to the true location of a boundary in 
order to prevail on the theory of boundary by acquiescence. 
Standard of Review: The District Court's determination of law is reviewed for 
correctness and no deference is granted to the District Court. James v. Galetka. 965 P.2d 
567(UtaApp. 1998). 
3. Did the Court err in law by failing to conclude that indolence created a 
conclusive presumption of acquiescence. 
Standard of Review: The District Court's determination of law is reviewed for 
correctness and no deference is granted to the District Court. James v. Galetka. 965 P.2d 
567 (UtaApp. 1998). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff/Appellant filed a complaint in the Second District Court for Morgan 
County, State of Utah asking the court to determine that a boundary line by acquiescence 
had been established between the parties' property as indicated by an existing fence that 
had been in place for a long period of time. A bench trial was held in Morgan County 
before the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge 
Glasmann ruled against the Plaintiff7Appellant on the basis that the boundary line was 
clear to the parties when the fence was originally installed. The court's findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order were entered on the 30th day of October, 1998. 
On March 26, 1998 Wilkinson/Appellant filed its Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment. Wilkinson/Appellant asked the court to reconsider its ruling in light of the 
fact that objective uncertainty is not an element, nor an affirmative defense, to the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. This motion was denied on November 4, 1998. 
Wilkinson/Appellant filed an appeal on the 19th day of November, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff hereinafter referred to as "Wilkinson" and the Defendant 
hereinafter referred to as "Babcock" are adjoining property owners in Morgan County, 
State of Utah. Babcock owns land north of the disputed area and Wilkinson owns land 
south of the disputed area. 
5 
2. The disputed area consists of a triangular tract of land containing 
approximately five acres. The north portion of this triangular piece is marked by a fence. 
The fence has been in place for an excess of 64 years. (Transcript, page 266 through 
269; Bench Ruling, page 2, Appendix A). The disputed area is shown on "Exhibit 28" 
which has been reduced and colored for the benefit of this court. (Appendix B). 
3. Wilkinson used the disputed property to grow wheat, alfalfa, grass and to 
graze cattle and sheep. (Transcript, page 126, 268, June 24, 1998 hearing transcript, 
page 30; Bench ruling, page 2, Appendix A). 
4. In 1970, Wilkinson placed part of the disputed property into a federal 
program with the agricultural stabilization and conversation service. A copy of an aerial 
photograph identified as "Exhibit 45" shows the Babcock and Wilkinson property and 
the disputed area. A portion of the property identified with a number 9 lies within the 
disputed area. The disputed area has been highlighted in blue and area 9 in red for the 
benefit of this court. The property that is fenced to the south of the disputed area 
contains a number of other portions of property that Wilkinson placed in the federal 
program. (Appendix C). 
5. Babcock acknowledged that three of the elements required for a boundary 
by acquiescence was proven by Wilkinson or were not disputed. Those were, 
(a) Occupation to a visible line; 
(b) for a long period of time; 
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(c) by adjoining property owners. 
(June 24 hearing transcript, page 12, line 24 through page 13, line 2; Bench 
ruling, page 3, Appendix A). 
6. The trial court found that the disputed area was used for some crop usage 
and cattle and that Babcock did not interrupt that use. (September 23, 1998 hearing 
transcript, page 18, lines 14 through 16). 
7. The trial court found that the fence line originally was not intended as a 
boundary line, but was a fence of convenience. (June 24, 1998 hearing transcript, page 
29, lines 12 through 13). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE FENCE WAS DETERMINATIVE AS 
TO THE ISSUE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
II. INDOLENCE CREATES A CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF 
ACQUIESCENCE. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE WAS REBUTTED BY THE 
LACK OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE TRUE LOCATION OF THE 
BOUNDARY. 
IV. EVIDENCE MARSHALED IN FAVOR OF BABCOCK 
7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL 
PURPOSE OF THE FENCE WAS DETERMINATIVE AS TO THE ISSUE 
OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
The parties in the lower court agree that three of the elements required for a 
boundary line by acquiescence was proven by the Plaintiff or were not disputed. Bruce 
A. Maak, attorney for Babcock, in an argument before Judge Glasmann stated, 
. . . Your Honor, we agree did find three elements. You 
found occupation to a visible line. A second element for a 
long time. A third by adjoining land owners. 
(June 24 hearing transcript, page 12, line 24 through page 13, line 2). 
Babcock, in her argument before the lower court, recognized that the court had 
found that a fence had been installed as a containment fence and that it had been used for 
that purpose. Babcock's attorney stated, 
It is that the fence had a purpose different than that of a 
boundary. It is a purpose to divide or contain stock where the 
land is returned. 
(June 24, 1998 hearing transcript, page 32). 
Judge Glasmann in his bench ruling stated as follows, 
Based on the strength of that case and on the overall evidence 
in this case of the occupation in the area, the Court believes 
that the presumption has been met on the Plaintiffs side of 
his case to suggest that there may have been a boundary line 
by acquiescence, but I can only get there if I view that the 
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phrase acquiescence as incorporating indolence and just not 
taking any action to kick someone off the disputed property. 
(Bench ruling, page 4, Appendix A). 
The court in its hearing on June 24, 1998 further clarified what the court meant by 
this language. The court stated that it found through testimony and a view of the land 
that the fence was put in originally to control stock and not to establish a boundary line. 
(June 24 hearing transcript, page 26, line 23 through page 27, line 1). The court 
continued by saying, 
But, the finding of the court, and there is no question in my 
mind that the boundary line was clear to the parties back then. 
There is testimony that it was clear back then. There's 
remnants of an old fence along the boundary. But this fence 
demarcated from that course for the convenience of putting a 
stock fence is where they felt the stock fence could last and 
be maintained so that the stock would be controlled. 
And so what I'm saying is the argument that Mr. Maak is 
making is accurate that was the Court's finding and, 
therefore, what he is saying is that it's not a question of now 
acquiescing in a new line that was a disputed boundary line. 
That fence was never put in to be the boundary line and so 
that, so when I use the word indolence, and I should clarify 
this. 
(June 24 hearing transcript, page 28, line 15 through page 29, line 4). 
In a subsequent hearing on September 23, 1998, the court clarified its position 
when it stated, 
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. . . The court is willing to stand on its original ruling and I 
find that the interpretation of the case law as submitted by 
your office, Mr. Echard, is different than my understanding of 
the law and I believe that there is a requirement that, the 
fence that was put in, be intended as a boundary fence and it 
was, and it's my finding, and I've made specific findings 
concerning this, is that it was not ever intended to be a 
boundary fence but rather a stock containment fence and that 
there was not an attempt to even put it close to what the 
actual boundary of the property was. 
(September 23, 1998 hearing transcript, page 4, lines 2 through 12). 
At that hearing, the court stated, that it was using the word "indolence" to 
describe someone not objecting to the use of property. (September 23, 1998 hearing 
transcript, page 11, lines 13 through 16). The court stated, 
What I want the facts to show is that the, again, we've 
already stated that the slant fence was the boundary line, not 
the boundary line but not intended as the boundary line but 
rather as a stock containment fence and that the area between 
the slanted fence and the actual boundary line between the 
properties, that the use that was made by Wilkinson was not 
disallowed by Babcocks or their predecessors and that they 
did not interrupt that use by Wilkinsons. 
(September 23, 1998 hearing transcript, page 14, lines 11 through 19). 
The court also stated, 
. . . I mean there were some cattle that were able to access that 
area and there was some crop usage that went on and nobody 
interrupted. 
(September 23 hearing transcript, page 18, lines 14 through 16). 
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It is clear from the court's bench ruling and subsequent statements that the court 
found that there was an existing fence, which is referred to by the court as a containment 
fence and that Wilkinson used the property enclosed by that fence for the raising of crops 
and the grazing of cattle. Babcock and her predecessors did not disallow or interrupt that 
use by Wilkinsons. The court referred to the inaction of Babcock as indolence and 
concluded that Babcock failing to take actions to kick the Wilkinsons off of the disputed 
property constituted indolence and an acquiescence in the Wilkinsons' use of the 
disputed property. 
The court concluded that when the containment fence was first put in, by 
Babcock's predecessor, Williams, the true boundary line was known. The fence was 
placed because of the land topography and convenience. (Bench ruling, page 1, 
Appendix A; June 24, 1998 hearing transcript, page 28, lines 15 through 22). The court 
found that the fence was originally not intended as a boundary line, but was a fence of 
convenience. (June 24, 1998 hearing transcript, page 29, lines 12 through 13). Babcock, 
in her argument before the court contended that the second element of "mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary" must be interpreted to mean that the parties 
intended the fence to be a boundary as opposed to a fence or line evidencing the parties 
occupation and use of the land. (June 24, 1998 hearing transcript, page 13, lines 3 
through 8). 
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It is clear from a review of the transcripts of the arguments made by counsel 
before the lower court that the court found, 
1. That a fence line was put in by the Babcock's predecessors, Williams; 
2. That the fence enclosed land that is legally described as being the property 
of the Babcocks; 
3. That the land was used by Wilkinson for growing crops and containing 
cattle for a long period of time; 
4. That Babcock was indolent in not interfering with or disallowing 
Wilkinson use of the land; and 
5. That the parties were adjoining property owners. 
The summary of the court's finding clearly focuses the legal issue to be decided 
by the appellate court. Babcock contends that acquiescence in the Wilkinson's use of the 
property inside of the fence cannot constitute a boundary line by acquiescence unless the 
fence originally was intended to establish a boundary line. Wilkinson contends that the 
acquiescence in the use of the property enclosed by the fence line regardless of the 
purpose of the installation of the fence constitutes an acquiescence in a boundary which 
after a long period of time establishes the boundary line between the adjoining property 
owners. Wilkinson contends that it makes no difference whether originally the fence was 
a line of convenience. The passage of a long period of time during which the property 
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was used by Wilkinson fulfills the requirement set forth by the court to satisfy the second 
requirement of "mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary". 
The Supreme Court in the case of Carter v. Hanrath, 925 P.2d. 960 (Utah 1996) 
stated the four requirements that must be met before a boundary by acquiescence can be 
established. The court stated that they were as follows: 
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by monuments, fences, or 
buildings; and 
(2) Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
(3) For a long period of time, 
(4) By adjoining property owners. 
Id at 962. 
The court stated in Carter that a party must have access to the fence or monument 
in order for acquiescence to occur. The court went on to state, 
. . . The rule of boundary by acquiescence serves a useful and 
practical purpose when applied in the typical fact situation, 
where adjoining owners are seemingly content to recognize a 
marked line or monument not on the true line as the practical 
boundary between them.. . . 
Id at 962. 
This court in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d. 417 (Utah 1990) rejected the 
requirement of objective uncertainty as to the boundary line, which had been established 
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by the court in Hallidav v. Cluff. 685 P.2d. 500 (Utah 1984). Reaching that decision, 
the court cited and rejected language in the Hallidav case, which stated, 
. . . By the same token, a claimant cannot assert boundary by 
acquiescence if he or his predecessors entitled had reason to 
know the true location of the boundary during the period of 
acquiescence. 
Id at 421. 
Judge Glasmann's ruling that mutual acquiescence was not established because 
the parties originally knew where the boundary line was and the fence was not 
constructed as a boundary line is another way of saying that there had to be objective 
uncertainty at the time the fence was installed in order to establish a boundary by 
acquiescence. Judge Glasmann's ruling is consistent with the court's decision in 
Hallidav, but is not in conformance with the court's ruling in Staker and Carter. 
POINT II 
INDOLENCE CREATES A CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF 
ACQUIESCENCE. 
In its ruling from the bench, the Court found that Wilkinson had met the 
presumption to establish a boundary line by acquiescence because of indolence on the 
partofBabcock. 
(Court's Bench Ruling, page 4, Appendix A). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that mutual acquiescence was presumed when 
indolence on the part of the land owner is found. Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment. 
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Inc., 511 P.2d 145 (Utah 1973). The court in Olsen not only held that indolence created a 
presumption of acquiescence, but that it creates a conclusive presumption. Id. at 147. 
The court in Olsen stated that a conclusive presumption is necessary in order to preserve 
the peace and stability of property interests. The Olsen court extensively discussed these 
public policy issues in boundary by acquiescence and then held: 
...Peace and good order of society require that there be 
stability, not only in the record land titles, but more 
importantly in the ownership and occupation of lands. It is for 
this reason that it has seemed sound policy that boundary 
lines which have been long established and accepted by those 
who should be concerned, should be left undisturbed in order 
to leave at rest matters which may have resulted in 
controversy and litigation. Wherefore, there has developed 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Its essence is that 
where there arises a dispute as to the boundary between 
parties and it appears that there is a recognizable physical 
boundary of any character which has been acquiesced in as a 
boundary for a long period of time, the conflict should be 
conclusively presumed to have been reconciled in some 
manner. It is our opinion that the police of encouraging 
peace and good order and of discouraging trouble and 
controversy demands that that be accepted as the correct 
doctrine, and that it need not depend upon rationalization as 
to ideas of estoppel, presumed agreements, lost grants, or 
other fictional concepts, (emphasis added) 
Id at 147. 
This doctrine was discussed in the case of Carter v. Hanrath 885 P.2d 801 (Utah 
App. 1994). Carter was then reversed on appeal by the Utah Supreme Court because of a 
lack of access to the disputed property. 925 P2d 960 (Utah 1996). However, the 
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language used by the Court of Appeals defining acquiescence is applicable. The Court 
of Appeals in Carter embellished upon and defined some of the requirements set forth in 
Staker. In discussing occupation, the court stated, that the land must be occupied to a 
visible line and normal and appropriate use made of the disputed parcel. In discussing 
the requirement of acquiescence the Court stated, 
. . . that the actual knowledge of the fence or monument 
marking the disputed boundary line is not a prerequisite in 
boundary-by-acquiescence cases " 
Id at 805. 
The Court went on to say, 
. . /[acquiescence' is more nearly synonymous with 
indolence,' or 'consent by silence,'--or a knowledge that a 
fence or other monuments appears to be a boundary,—but that 
no one did anything about it. Lane v. Walker. 29 Utah 2d 
119, 505 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973). This accords with the 
dictionary definition of acquiescence as [p]assive compliance 
or satisfaction . . . [conduct from which assent may be 
reasonably inferred. . . . Equivalent to assent inferred from 
silence with knowledge or from encouragement, and 
presupposes knowledge and assent. Black's Law Dictionary 
24 (6th ed. 1990). 
• • • 
. . .Moreover, our holding that acquiescence may be imputed 
from long-term indolence is consistent with the policy upon 
which boundary by acquiescence is based, namely 'that the 
peace and good order of society require that there be stability 
. . . in the ownership of lands [B]oundary lines which 
have been long established and accepted by those who should 
be concerned should be left undisturbed in order to leave at 
rest matters which may have resulted in controversy and 
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litigation.' James Backman, The Law of Practical Location 
of Boundaries and the Need for an Adverse Possession 
Remedy. 1986 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 957, 965 (1986) (quoting 
Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co.. Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 
P.2d 145, 147(1973)). 
Id at 806. 
The District Court concluded that Wilkinson had met the elements for boundary 
by acquiescence. However, the Court then rebutted that presumption by finding that 
there was no uncertainty as to the true location of the boundary line. The District Court 
stated, 
The defense in this case has argued that while even if the 
Court finds [acquiescence] that the Court should go further 
and take a look at whether the presumption could be rebutted 
by the purpose of the fence when it was installed and are the 
true boundary being whether it was unknown or uncertain. 
Now, in this case . . . the Wilkinson family called out deed 
lines that shouldn't be real difficult to follow. They are great 
right angles, they follow section or quarter section lines and 
the Court doesn't find in this case that there was confusion or 
needed to be confusion about where the actual boundary line 
was. 
(Court's bench ruling, pages 4 and 5, Appendix A). 
From this language, it appears that the District Court has allowed the Babcocks to 
rebut the presumption of acquiescence by finding that there was no objective uncertainty 
in the true location of the fence. This is contrary to Utah law as set forth in Olsen which 
created a conclusive presumption of acquiescence. 
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POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESUMPTION 
OF ACQUIESCENCE WAS REBUTTED BY THE LACK OF UNCERTAINTY 
AS TO THE TRUE LOCATION OF THE BOUNDARY. 
Even if indolence does not create a presumptive conclusion, the District Court's 
finding of uncertainty as to the true location of the boundary confuses the doctrines of 
boundary by acquiescence and boundary by agreement. There has been considerable 
confusion regarding these two doctrines which arose out of the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P.2d 912 (Utah 1928). As discussed in Staker, supra 
this confusion eventually resulted in the addition of objective uncertainty by the court in 
Halladay v. Cluff, supra. The court in Staker not only overruled the requirement of 
objective uncertainty, but also clarified the fact that a dispute regarding uncertainty as to 
the location of the true boundary line is not an element in boundary by acquiescence and 
that the line of cases which state otherwise are relying on the confused language of Tripp 
and were overruled. Staker at 422. To hold otherwise "restricts what was already a 
restrictive doctrine, and 'effectively eliminate[s] boundary by acquiescence as a viable 
doctrine for settling property disputes in Utah." Id. at 423. 
Cases cited by the Defendant in support of creating a rebuttable presumption 
using objective uncertainty are recognized by the Utah Supreme Court as having 
confused the doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and boundary by agreement. Both 
cases cited by the Defendant to support this theory of a rebuttable presumption were used 
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by the Utah Supreme Court in Staker as examples of cases confusing these two doctrines. 
The Staker court stated, 
In previous opinions, this Court even referred to the doctrines 
as though they had merged into one [citation omitted]. The 
pivotal case upon which the Halladay majority relied in 
expressly declaring uncertainty or dispute a requirement in 
boundary by acquiescence was Tripp v. Bagley. 276 P.2d 912 
(1928). 
Staker at 422. 
The court went on to cite two portions of the Tripp opinion which demonstrate the 
confusion of the court then stated: 
Cases which followed Tripp seized upon this dicta, which we 
deem to be unfortunate in its impact, and intermittently began 
to refer to a showing of uncertainty or dispute in a boundary 
by acquiescence context. 
Id at 422. 
Defendant relies upon Tripp for the proposition that the presumption is rebuttable 
and that uncertainty as to the actual boundary is an element for the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence. The other case cited by Defendant, Ringwood v. Bradford. 269 P.2d 
1056 (Utah 1954), is one of those cases which relied upon the Tripp_opinion for its 
holding. 
Uncertainty or dispute in a boundary is a requirement in the doctrine of boundary 
by agreement. Wright v. Clissold. 521 P.2d 1224 (1994). It is not an element for 
boundary by acquiescence. 
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The District Court erred in permitting Babcock to rebut the presumption of 
acquiescence with evidence of a lack of objective uncertainty. 
POINT IV 
EVIDENCE MARSHALED IN FAVOR OF BABCOCK 
Wilkinson has not asked this court to reverse the trial court's findings of fact. 
Wilkinson does ask the court to reverse the trial court's application of law to the facts. 
This Court has previously ruled that in order for an appellant to successfully challenge 
the trial court's findings, the Appellant must marshal the evidence in favor of the 
opposing party and show that the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Wade v. Stand. 869 P.2d 9 (Utah 1994). Wilkinson believes that Babcock will 
acknowledge that the trial court found that the presumption of acquiescence was rebutted 
by the trial court's finding that when the fence was originally installed the original 
boundary was known and that the fence was not intended for a boundary line, but as a 
containment fence. Consequently, the issue in dispute on this appeal is the court's 
application of the law to those findings of fact. As indicated in the other points of 
argument in this brief, the proper application of existing law to the facts should result in 
a reversal of the trial court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue before this court is whether or not the Plaintiff proved the necessary 
elements to establish a boundary line by acquiescence. The parties in the lower court 
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agreed that three of the elements required for a boundary line by acquiescence was 
proven by the Plaintiff or were not disputed. Those were: 
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by monuments, fences or 
buildings; 
(2) For a long period of time; 
(3) By adjoining property owners. 
The only remaining issue was whether or not the parties had mutually acquiesced 
in the line as a boundary. The district court found that Wilkinson had established a 
presumption of boundary line by acquiescence because of indolence on the part of 
Babcock. The court, however, found that the presumption had been rebutted because at 
the time that the fence was originally established, the parties predecessors knew the true 
boundary line and the fence was not intended to be a boundary, but a stock containment 
fence. 
Wilkinson contends that the trial court's finding of indolence on the part of 
Babcock raised a conclusive presumption of acquiescence and that that presumption 
could not be rebutted because of objective uncertainty at the time that the fence was first 
installed. The court in Staker and subsequent cases rejected the doctrine of objective 
uncertainty. Under current Utah law, a physical boundary of any character, which has 
been acquiesced in as a boundary for a long period of time conclusively establishes a 
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presumption of a boundary by acquiescence. The trial court's application of the law is 
contrary to the decision of the supreme court and the court of appeals, and therefore, this 
Court should reverse the trial court's decision and enter a ruling that Wilkinson has 
established a boundary line by acquiescence and is the owner of the disputed property. 
DATED this / p S a y of May, 1999. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant Brief, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following individual: 
Bruce Maak 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
DATED this/^-day of May, 1999. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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APPENDIX A 
TRANSCRIPTION OF RULING-WILKINSON FAMILY L.L.C. 
JUDGE GLASMANN: We will call the matter of Wilkinson Family Farm, L.L.C. v. 
Babcock and this is the Morgan case, let's see if I can refer to the number 960000010. 
First of all, welcome to our court here in Ogden. I appreciate you folks making the trip 
here. I also apologize for some delay since we tried this case in getting the decision to you. I 
have been fairly busy and it's just taken some time to get back to you. 
Let's start off by making the observation that this is a decision the Court is going to make 
on the record with the parties present following a several day trial that was conducted in Morgan. 
My compliments to you counsel on the way the case was presented and I have had a chance to 
review the facts and the evidence before me, the exhibits and also the trial briefs that have been 
submitted; and I now go into my findings and issue a decision in this case. 
FINDINGS 
First of all, by way of general observation, the ground that is in dispute was clear between 
the parties is what's turned out to be kind of a triangular shaped piece of property and it is the 
triangle that exists between the actual survey line and the location of a fence line that was 
established by the Williams family, the predecessors in the interest to the Defendant Babcock. 
The ground in dispute was homesteaded by the Williams family in the 1800's. The deed from the 
United States Government in this case contained a description that followed section lines or 
quarter section lines and created parcels of ground that had four square corners. This was also 
true, not only of the Defendant's predecessors in interest, but also the Wilkinsons' adjoining 
piece of ground. 
Property taxes on the triangular piece that is in question have always been paid by the 
Defendant or its predecessors in interest. I find from the evidence that was presented, that two 
fences had existed on the boundary line and when I say the boundary line in this case, the actual 
survey line consistent with the survey line and that those fences, evidence of those fences 
existing was presented in the form of some testimony and photographs of the old fence posts and 
some old wire in the area. Those fences have not existed, I find for a number of years and that 
the only existing fence between the parcels of property was the fence line that took off on 
somewhat of a diagonal direction and is along the line that is the line that is claimed by the 
Plaintiffs Wilkinsons in this case. I find that that fence line that takes off on the diagonal has 
been the only fence in that area for well over twenty years. 
There was some testimony from Darrell Meacham in the case about a more recent 
creation of not only that diagonal fence but the fence along the actual survey line. The Court 
believes that that testimony was helpful and in some parts it was somewhat inconsistent with 
other testimony given, but I find on balance from the facts that it has been over twenty years 
since a fence has existed on the actual survey line, and I find that from the overall testimony and 
from the physical descriptions of what was found on the actual survey line. 
With regard to Plaintiffs use of the ground, I find that the Plaintiffs livestock to the 
extent there at times were livestock in that area, have been able to roam and graze up to the 
diagonal fence line and I find that Plaintiffs have also planted somewhat on the disputed 
triangular piece, but not up to the fence line and certainly, not 100% of the property. I'd 
approximate that more in the nature of maybe 50% of the ground and that varied somewhat from 
time to time. 
There was some time spent on the Plaintiffs side of the case concerning minutes from 
Planning Commission meetings as the Defendant Babcock's were attempting to get a subdivision 
approved and reference made to the Babcocks not including this ground for purposes of getting 
their subdivision approved. The Court finds that is sort of a "red herring" because the reason that 
the Babcocks did that is to be able to say to the planning commission, we want the subdivision 
approved, we have a dispute over the triangular piece and just for the sake of approval of the 
subdivision we are proposing, leave it out, that may well be able to get the subdivision approved 
that they were proposing but it was still clear that the triangular piece was in dispute, so I don't 
find in any way that the Babcocks had given up their claim or their dispute that they should be 
the owners of that triangular piece. 
There was also some testimony about potentially statements made to give an indication 
that that was given up, but I find that the exhibit number one that was introduced that was the 
agreement, it clearly covers that there is an area that was in dispute and I believe that it's 
Paragraph 2 on Page 2. It says that a boundary line dispute exists relative to the existing fence 
line located along the south boundary of the Fox Hollow subdivision. Parties do not intend to 
resolve that dispute by this agreement and reserve their claims relative to that dispute. This was 
signed by both parties and clearly covers that issue. 
I will continue on with some facts in a moment, but right at this point I would like to 
observe that as has been briefed by the parties, in order for their to be a boundary line by 
acquiescence, there would have to be occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, 
fences, or buildings. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary for a long period of time by 
adjoining land owners. 
Now certainly, the Court believes that the occupation up to the visible line, which would 
be the diagonal fence line, that that element is met. That number three, for a long period of time 
was met, as I've found already, I believe that that was for well over twenty years and the parties 
were adjoining land owners. The tougher question, and it's one that the attorney's have dealt 
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with and I think, you know, well in your briefs is this question of mutual acquiescence in the 
line as a boundary. I think that attorneys and judges for ages have struggled with what 
acquiescence means. It has been argued by Mr. Echard's side of the case that acquiescence can 
mean indolence and they have cited a case that points out factually that we had a land owner 
there that didn't even realize they were being occupied on the lands that belonged to them by 
way of survey, and the courts upheld that not even knowing about it could be indolence on your 
part and that could qualify for the element of mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
Now, in that case that was cited by Mr. Echard, there had been a building built in that area, 
grazing of animals and I don't recall but it seemed to me that there may have been some crop 
growth that had gone on in that area. 
Based on the strength of that case and on the overall evidence in this case of the 
occupation in the area, the Court believes that the presumption has been met on the Plaintiffs 
side of this case to suggest that there may have been a boundary line by acquiescence, but I can 
only get there if I view that the phrase acquiescence as incorporating indolence and just not 
taking any action to kick someone off of the disputed property. 
The defense in this case has argued that while even if the Court finds that the Court 
should go further and take a look at whether the presumption could be rebutted by the purpose of 
the fence when it was installed and are the true boundary being whether it was unknown or 
uncertain. 
Now, in this case, as I've said in the beginning, the original deed that came in from the 
United States Government, and this would have been not only the deed that went to the Williams 
family, the Defendant's predecessors in the interest but also the Wilkinson family called out deed 
lines that shouldn't be real difficult to follow. They are great right angles, they follow section or 
quarter section lines and the Court doesn't find in this case that there was confusion or needed to 
be confusion about where the actual boundary line was. This is a case, and I think the record 
already will reflect that the Court, myself as the judge along with the parties had a chance to 
walk over the ground and it was very valuable. I found that the topography was steeper terrain 
than what your models depicted to me or what I had gleaned from the photographs that were 
presented. The topographer of the land in this case from my perspective created somewhat of a 
natural barrier between these adjoining property owners in terms of their use of the land. The 
area that is near where the boundary line went through is quite steep, there is a cliffy area and 
some deep swales that made fencing in this area difficult. 
The Court believes that it was rather graphically demonstrated even though, I would have 
to say that I've worked on some fences over there, I've never had the fence ground quite that 
hilly, and it was quite graphically demonstrated to the Court, in a deep swell is attempted to be 
crossed with a cattle fence, but in order to go down into the low portion, that you are fighting 
against the natural tension, you are attempting to put on the fence through the rest of the run of 
the fence and over time, it would have a tendency to pull the fence up out of the low swell and 
allow an area for cattle to get down underneath it and escape. 
The Court finds having walked the ground, having looked at it, and having examined 
where the fence was run and taking into account all of your testimony in this case, that the angled 
fence was put in, and its purpose for being put in was to keep livestock in the Williams' parcel, 
or the Defendant's parcel, the Defendant's predecessor in interest, and that was its sole purpose 
and it was not put in in order to establish the boundary line. 
The Court based on that finding is ruling in favor of the Defendants in this case and I find 
that the actual boundary line should be that of the survey line and should follow the line where 
the newer fence was put in after the Defendants had torn out this older fence that followed the 
angled line. In so finding, I also find that this was a legitimate dispute between these parties that 
they certainly had the right to come to court and peacefully work out in a court of law, and the 
Court believes that each party should bear their own attorney's fees and costs in this action. Not 
costs, excuse me, but attorney's fees in that the costs should be awarded to the prevailing party. 
Now, have I left you and your side with any questions on the defense side. 
DEFENSE: No, your honor. 
JUDGE GLASMANN: Mr. Echard? 
BOB: No, your honor. 
JUDGE GLASMANN: Alright, I'll ask you then on the defense side to prepare 
findings and an order for the Court to sign and submit those to Mr. Echard if you would for his 
approval. Again, I thank you folks and unless there are any questions the Court will be in recess 
at this time. 
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S^COHD DISTRICT 
98HQY-*» WT2-W 
Bruce A. MaaE/Of Counsel (2033) 
PARR, WADO&jfcS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for tfeadants Lara L. and Mike Babcock 
185 South State;Sfc«£Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 " 
Salt Lake City, Utah :84147 
Telephone: 801-532U7S40 
Fax: 801-532-7750 
IN THE p C O N p JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MORGAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WTUONSON P A m V FARM, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARA L. and MIKE BABCOCK, and all 
other {>aftiesidx$^^.\xnk^^ that-may 
descriM& 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 960000010 
(Hon. Michael J. Glasmann) 
HThe tml:*f thMietidncanie btfreeularly before the Court, the Honorable Michael J. 
Glasmi^'prTOi^^ 12, 1997, plaintiff appearing through its counsel, 
Robert^ ^ Edahtf^  Miiflefisndarits anriSlriQg through their counsel, Bruce A. Maak, and the 
Court 3Svm£Ieaidl^cyid^i^ bffcrWby the parties and the arguments of counsel and 
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having considered^matters oh file herein, and the Court having announced its decision, 
now thereforerthe Court herebv makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff- Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC ("Wilkinson") is a limited liability 
company organized' under the laws of the State of Utah. 
•ti- • DtJfehdMs LaraX. Babcock and Michael Babcock ("Babcocks") are each 
citizens of the $&&J6f Utahresiding in Morgan County, Utah. 
3; Wilkinson and Babcocks own adjoining tracts of land located in Morgan 
Countyy^^|§ |S^^ land owned by Babcocks is as follows: 
^#^^^^|^"#Jfi^|BSg;^gieast quarter of the Northwest quarter (SEW 
p W ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ h y g g l q ^ ^ o f the Northeast quarter (SWW NEW) of 
^ p c ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l j ^ ^ ^ n g e 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
pJ^::S&^eff^^^^^^^^b3h, being more particularly described as 
tallows ?ftM^^§2§iG&m&M said Southeast quarter of the Northwest 
patter WS^m^m&EJWgmpf said Southwest quarter of the Northeast 
The tix%of laSRials^^djfifSctlialeWlbove is hereinafter referred to as the "Babcock 
Propeiry^;/i§£&^ has been conveyed to others since Babcocks 
acQuu f^fT °?@|Krj^PI*^^Q^efe^are not at issue in this action. The legal description 
of the M a^iung^ laiia''€poed,nby.^ WJk||ic^ i is as follows: 
" J S S i ^ ^ S ^ ? ^ ^ ! ! ! ^ ? - ^ ^ * * 0 1 1 3 0 » Township 5 North, Range 2 East, 
" ^ ^ J ^ i J ^ ^ S l f t ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S l S * 1 6° rods; m e n c e W e s t 3 2 0 rods; thence 
^ ^ f g r ^ ^ ^ K ^ Sod^«i^ay to the South line of Section 30; thence 
J | | r 2 ^ ^ 5 r ^ J s ^ Being a portion of the South half of 
• 2 -
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The tract of land described immediately above is here*02^ referred to as the "Wilkinson 
Prop^y-" 
4. The northerly boundary of the Wilkinson Property is coincident widi the 
souuV y^.toundary ^ the Babcock Property. For illustrative purposes, following is a 
diagram showing the location of die Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property in the 
vicinity or* their conanon boundary, along with the locations of various fences. 
S<t V+ * * * ^ S W J ^ K S ^ . 
/ 
BA£os<k: ptte*c*.-rr 
TJW f^rVJUJi^i JB-jg 
i 
YGLXjf&ari fiBe*e8Irr\ 
j J S E ? * ^ 
* * 
* * 
M 
c« 
N W ^ * 2 4 »»* 
5! Iiraro-^ ffOTi-Wilkinion i^aims ownership o f *e triangular portion of die 
propertyTESfe" ^ pniffifiegaf descrgftkM of the BabccX* Property which lies south of a 
fcnce slasSg nofoi^ oiHflaie Troe Bburfcoy, which is identified as the "Slant Fence" in die 
-3-
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diagram above;and will be hereinafter referred to as the "Slant Fence/ As used in these 
Findings and GoiKilusidns, "True Boundary" shall mean and refer to the boundary between 
the Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property that is established by their respective legal 
descriptions. The location of the "True Boundary" is so identified in the diagram above. 
6; The chain of title to the Babcock Property began with a conveyance from the 
United States Of America to James Williams during 1897. Title to the Babcock Property 
passed from James Williams to Elwood Williams and Mabel Williams, his wife. Elwood 
Willia^ a n d ^ Babcock Property until 1958, when the Babcock 
Propel!!^ and James E, Williams, who are the sons of 
BwodJfjjad M a ^ and Douglas Williams conveyed the Babcock 
Prop(^§) l | l ^ ^ 
> ^ ; ^ | f ^ ^ covering the Babcock Property, which are 
mention^ the southerly boundary of the Babcock Property as 
the I i ^ B o i i n ^ ^ line running east and west of Section 30, 
T o w n s p ^ J l - : ^ ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ W ^ Base and Meridian. 
• Br
 : f^lihe- t^pdSOii feiMly ©§£ acquired an interest in the Wilkinson Property 
when Wm w f t i i i ^ received a conveyance of the Wilkinson Property 
in 1935| J 6 ! § ^ conveyed the Wilkinson Property to Hairy 
W i l k n p t t ^ in 1955. Harry Wilkinson and Dorothy 
Wilkir^® ^ £ i ^ to Hany Wilkinson and Dorothy Wilkinson, as 
tenants p£<#^ and Dorothy Wilkinson conveyed the 
-4-
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Wilfcinsoh Pr^p^t^Wuldnson Family Partnership in 1984 and 1985. Wilkinson Family 
Partnership cdn^eyWjie Wiflcmson Property to Willcinson Family Farm, LLC in 1995. 
9\ ^ jEapi"of me deeds covering the Wilkinson Property that effect the conveyances 
describes in ^ "pjnweimg paragraph describe the northerly boundary of the Wilkinson 
Prop f^$pK ^^^^l^^l%^3fhML-K'the half section line ninning east and west of 
SectiogQ, ¥ 4 ^ ^ | ® S c ^ ^ a a ^ ^ E a s t , Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
'••1PM' :tfk-?$;3?i|| " e^ed5;¥ff«^ag conveyances of the Babcock Property and the 
W i l l d n ^ 1 h ^ ^ ^ ^ M ^ : b e § e e n those properties is described as a straight line 
0-e., a 3 ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ P r ^ l ^ . * ^ ^ n g from a straight line), that straight line being a 
half se^raa iSfe^vc %£ '•• "-'•. ! v.: -%Y 
'•8 5? ' J - l V M * ^ ^ ^ 3 ^ ^ H ^ ° n against Babcocks seeking a determination that 
W i l k i n ^ f i ' 6 \ ^ ^ | ^ x ^ t e l y trafigular tract of land lying south of the Slant Fence. 
A safv^j^y "^tt^&^pf me dispute^property is as follows: 
^|«tt«l;bf-fead^&iatemtiteisfortheast quarter and the Northwest quarter of 
'^&Saa^vfe^^"iUa^&kagit 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
M^gafi Cot«%^ particularly described as follows: Com-
%)acing j£-the West quartbir cbftier of Section 30; thence South 88 °42' 14" 
Ea^2463l6t;feef;to the' triie "p]M of beginning; thence North 00°00'00" East 
W ^ ! J^,';men& Norm^r4i*i9" East 450.84 feet; thence North 79°58'48" "~ 
^ . l ^ ^ / ^ ^ e n c e . Nprm"76°'23'47" East 1087.06 feet; thence South 
^!3S'W ^eftp5.99 fe*t; flpfce North 88*42'14* West 1604.50 feet to the 
J*#t irffe^ g^iiiningV • . -; ,- '-:•. ^  
The Notke pf^i .^Pfebd .^recoi^eVi.pn behalf of Wilkinson in this action describes the 
disputed^^rope^yalsfoil^ ws:! •;'•_". •":'//-. 
Al&ct ^ l^s ] l t^"mthe Sotilhwest K of the Northeast W and the South-
east J4 .of&VNorfliwest % of Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East, 
-5-
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Salt Lake Base aid Meridian, lying South of Fox Hollow Subdivision and East 
of the Dennis and Lenore Hancock property deeded in Book M79 at Page 551 
of Official ftecofeds, more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of said Section 30, thence North 
89°09'43* West 1320 feet, thence South 2350 feet more or less to the South 
fence line ofJPdx Hollow Subdivision, the true point of beginning, thence 
following':^ South line, South 76°23'74" West 1087.06 feet, thence South 
79°58'48JVWest126.84 feet, thence South 87°42'19n West 450.84 feet, thence 
South 0a°O0W^Eart 10.64 feet, thence North 88°42'14" East 1550 feet more 
^ I t e ^ t & ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ & ^ ^ ^ t h e Southwest lA of the Northeast W of said 
j $ | ^ or less to the South line of Fox 
i f i ^ i fc pdi&fof beginning. 
That a j ^ t i m l ^ (whichever description is accurate) is hereinaftei 
refen^ife'asfSi^D^ffed -Ptdp^^i 
-E£ ! *^^e^I-^teeJdifjfere^'jpa&es have existed in the vicinity of the Disputed 
Property.?^Am¥t^j^'^De'ia^ei 6ifc* very close to the True Boundary in excess of 20 
years aj^ia t f i e ^ in paragraph 4 as the "Old Fence." 
BabcttcferS^^ close ®J& Old Fence on the True Boundary during 1996, 
In addition-, n ^ - f e " ^ was installed by Babcocksf predecessors, which 
fence i s j ^ t i f ^ a s fi»"*Slant ffefe^ofl the diagram above. The Slant Fence is the only 
fence thit has^edSted iflrthe area Of the Disputed Property for in excess of 20 years. 
li\: T&Htermii in the vicinity of the Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property 
is generiatlly rolfag'Mfe^but in the area of the True Boundary south of the Slant Fence, there 
exists uiffi^ally>fi^ t^ii^ topograp^"1 This steep, cliffy topography has made installation 
of a fencei alorijff thiefiue Boundary extremely difficult in this area. Any fence installed on 
the Tmd;Boursfeiy fa Oris area would teye been extremely difficult to install and almost 
-6-
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impossible to ffigiffl^^ teusion in any fence installed in this area would tend to pull up 
posts aid wiieilft^ fence, which in turn would allow livestock to 
escape.:.,,* '':^01^\. '"•:• 
14, ^ ^ j ^ g t a p h y in the area of the Slant Fence, however, was like the 
surrounding t o p t ^ j p ^ y and allowed easy, convenient fencing and was suitable for a 
livestock tontaii^^ 
IS; D i i i ^ the Court inspected the property at issue in this action. The 
. . . . . . « • ' . •»•:••.• 
CoUTt
 ^ S ' l l ^ p K M ^ . ^ ^ ^ I I ^ . F e n c e departed from the straight line of the True 
B o u n d S S „ ^ ^ ^ ^ R | B i ^ ^ ^ R ^ l o n S m e kalf section line lying to the west of me 
D i s p u t e r t ^ ^ ^ S ^ k l S J ^ S i S ^ ? ' a s not located on the straight line of the True 
•S i 'a i '^^^^Si^ 1 ??^^^^^ 1 1 5 0 1 1 Property and the Babcock Property was 
neither "SS^g^^^igK&taM^^I^ TiW 
iWg- |^ | f t t j<^:wff i jfi^fei by the then-owner of the Babcock Property in 
excess g f f y ^ g ^ g p ^ jjaflt iFenW was not installed to establish a boundary or was not 
ins
^
ledSii^SI?l1^^fe^Mt^J®Lb°undary between the Wilkinson Property andjhe 
Babcocfe|^^e||r*^a^|^ffie StiMVb^y/as installed for the exclusive purpose of con-
taining igipc^bij^l^ttjck: Pr^rflmd preventing livestock from escaping from the 
B a b c o c ^ l p t i ^ f f i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . Q ^ r t y * Tbe only reason why the fence in the 
vrcin'tyillp Qlpl^Sc^rty ;^ asnwjiiways installed along the True Boundary was 
because MM? W$&*$i& 3n the area .^mstallation of a livestock containment fence along 
-7-
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the Tn»:^imdi^;,5^1d be extremely difficult, maintenance of the fence would be 
extremely dlfficu1t;:vaiid a fence located on the True Boundary would not effectively contain 
livestock. The S^t^eSce was installed where it was so that it would effectively and 
conveniently fu^oi i» ; a livestock containment fence and avoid the extreme topography in 
the vicinity of the^r&EouiKiary. 
1& BabiSCKckij* predecessors did not interrupt the use of a portion of me Disputed 
Property by WfflanSori^  predecessors. 
19.;"*. The Hv&tdck of Wilkinson and its predecessors have, from time to time, 
g r a z e d
 ^ ^ ^ l ] ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ : ^ t ^ l ! i ^ ^ ' s ^ a n t Fence. In addition, from time to time, 
Wilkins^[^3g^^^^^r¥JSiw^^|^^ted something less than one-half of the Disputed 
I
^ P e ^ § 3 ^ P $ ^ W | f r y # M ^ ^ p > the Slant Fence. 
^ S | ; # ^ ^ | J p r l m ^ i ^ p X ) v a l for their subdivision, Babcocks did not 
^
l u de®|3is |^^^^^t5r .^tni fprg^sed subdivision. Babcocks intentionally excluded 
the D i s p| | |§^<3?e^ |^^ application in order to avoid objections to 
OTMivisffilfli^O^^ e : ^ ^ ^ ® , l i h o o d o f subdivision approval and not because 
they ^ W ^ l # W ^ r | j ^ ^ f W D i s p Q e d Property. 
*%££ ^^^/^ WuldhsohfifVe on various occasions discussed exchanging 
various j ^ ^ j ^ i a ^ ^ S e d by each {raffae mutual benefit of both, including exchanges 
mvolvingjTOc^^'^O^Blaf to Wilkn^^f the Disputed Property. However, Babcocks 
and Will^OTn;nwei|ir^^. at any agrepient under which Babcocks agreed to give up any 
-8-
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claim to die D ^ ^ . P ^ p e r t y or to transfer ownership of the Disputed Property to Wilkinson. 
22. J & b ^ l b and their predecessors have paid all real property taxes on the 
Disputed Property^Wuldnson and its predecessors have never paid any real property taxes 
on the D^sputeHlPtf^ 
23:. WMnsoi}and its predecessors occupied up to the Slant Fence for in excess of 
20yearv '//-i/Ji'lf//. ''•'.' 
24. Wtlfarison and its predecessors, on the one hand, and Babcocks and their 
predecdsi^, " ^ l ^ ] ^ 
?5f I- ' ^ ? ^ ^ * i i ^ ^ p i | ^ i ^ s p r s and Babcocks and their predecessors did not 
m u t u a U y ^ i ^ f e ^ ^ between die Wilkinson Property and the 
Babcockl^open^ 
26W;:: Wul^sWi^atisedto be r^rded a certain Notice of Lis Pendens relating to 
*» "
c
^.3?^i^:^Sl^'^^S^e o f ** Morgan County Recorder on December 
4, l ^ ' $ : f i ^ % . ^ | ^ ' : ^ ; : f i ^ j i | | ^ 4 at Pages 385-387. 
S t : W : 0 \ ^ : ^ ' • -. CONCitjSIONS OF LAW 
Based upcm the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes and enters the_ 
following j(gS>pi^^£^'^.:J^^Y^/\--'..a ^ "-;.3" v .'" 
1. ?.< =•'.: Wiflanrotijaajd Babcocks are adjoining landowners within the meaning of the 
doctrine of;fciiu>ijtt^by^ a c ^ i e ^ n ^ br'ajgreement. 
2
' !.. WlfikiS^n^aacl its predec^brs occupied up to the Slant Fence for longer than 
20 years within the ineffluhfi of the"dffc&ne of boundary by acquiescence or agreement. 
-9-
1 2 - V P - 1 q q n 1 3 : ^ P M c^nM JO 93932340 P . 1 i 
3: Babcocks and their predecessors, on the one hand, and Wilkinson and its 
predecessors, on tittf otter hand, knew or should have known that the boundary line between 
their respective properties was the True Boundary and knew of its location on the ground. 
The location on the" ground of the True Boundary was never uncertain or unknown to either 
Wilkinson and its .predecessors or Babcocks and their predecessors. 
4, ' The purpose of the Slant Fence was always and exclusively to contain live-
stock and not to establish a boundary. The Slant Fence was located where it was because a 
Hvestocfc^i^ be installed and maintained on the True 
Bcn ind^£?^ predecessors agreed that the Slant Fence 
*r»r*r. . c . 
would t p f ^ j a M containment fence. Both Wilkinson and its 
predec^ofs Hid BiteocSfiridlSilif jroSecessors knew that the Slant Fence was not located 
on the l?d*fi^^ and the Wilkinson Property. 
K§??\ ; ^ i l l ^ Disputed Property was not objected to by 
Babrod^prctiHs^ :'•--- !^-:. 
.**£""' ' ^y^Sh^S^ca^^jm;^^ predecessors ever agreed with Wilkinson or its 
p r c d e c e s ^ t o ^ Property or to convey the Disputed 
PropertytoWilicm^ft si* its ^ radaa&sorl-
;£? *:]tfej3ocri1ne of bounder J>y acquiescence or agreement does not apply in this 
^tion.:^:; ^j-^dMy/^^^y^^dR 
. § ^ \ |B&^o^"jcp^ii ^ . Di^^foa Property free and clear of any claim of Wilkinson 
and its $t€dec£ssors. 
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97 WilKtosonTs Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits 
and Baiicocks'3&o|$if ,i>e: awarded their costs. 
10. ^ • ^ o t i c t of Lis Pendens recorded by Wilkinson with respect to this action 
should be releas^iitf dl^harge^ 
MADEMfi&EftrE&Eb this •'•3& day of October, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable MichaeTJ. Glasmann 
District Judge' 
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TO: WIUONSpN FAMILY FARM AND ITS COUNSEL: 
You will pi^se take notice that the undersigned attorney for defendants Babcocks will 
submit the fore^omg tdihe Court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the 
date this ix>tice^$^teS'(fo you, allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection 
is filed prior t6 S i f S S ^ ;ptiisuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
.^^^S^S^^^^^iber, 1998. 
Bruce A. Maak 
Attorney for Defendants Babcocks 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
was served this *-rgr day ofOdtobcr, 1998 by mailing on said date copies thereof by 
United States mafcTirSt class postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Robert A. Echard, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2491 Washington Boulevard, Suite 200 
C^dea, Utah 84401 
Merven E. Smith, Esq. 
Smith* Knowtes &. Hamilton 
^^^j^f4g$^fekiants Babcock 
^ p ^ r ^ ^ ^ c v a r d , Suite 200 
Kris Henriod, Secretary 
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SECOND DISTRICT 
MGPGAN COUNTY 
98K0V-U PM12*01 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Coonsel (2033) 
PARR, WADDptJK; BRiDWN, GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Dcfd&^;Lara L. and Mike Babcock 
185 South StateSta, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 ; • S : ; 
Salt Lake City, Utan^  84X47 
Telephone: 80i-532-fS#; 
Fax: 8Q1*S32-7750V ': ] 
IN THE StG6t^|> JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MORGAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
< • » • > - « • 
limited IiaKfity :tcnfii7^ i?^  
!~jr!*.- »* 
VS, 
LARA Li WMlKBBAffOXX,;a^ 
other partMTbKM^ or^ ledip^ wtt tti&^pj 
claim an la^rertv^'-i^i^'Cptope^vi 
described l^eiiK-
D«f«JdantSv 
ORDER 
Civil No. 960000010 
(Hon. Michael J. Glasmann) 
Pl^h*s^odaK^'^8SFW; :i^W Judgment dated Match 25, 1998, plaintiffs 
Objection/M$in|pgsof ^ t atKiCdntp&rons of Law dated March 25, 1998, and plaintiffs 
Objarion to Mefipr^^ 6, 1998, came on regularly before the Court 
for dcc is io |JM$^^ ^^B^i»ne conference on September 23, 1998, the Court 
having pi^<^if{M^ti^iM bi^ arg^e^it on certain of these morions and the Court having 
12-07-lggg 12:46PM FROM TO 93932340 P.05 
reviewed the parties' memoranda and other submissions with respect to these motions and 
having heard ftnther argument from counsel for the parties, the Court being advised and 
good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment be and the same is hereby 
denied, 
2. ' W& respect to plaintiffs Objection to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment, the Court has reviewed the Findings of J?act and Conclusions of Law served 
herein by defendant's couhselon March 13, 1998 (referred to herein as the "Proposed 
Findin^s^id Gw^EH^f>^^;|te^OT^ hereby orders that those Proposed Findings and 
C o n c l u s ^ i y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ p ^ ^ ^ ^ E i g respects: 
^ l l l ^ g ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ F i n d i n g s of F^t in the Proposed Findings and 
l & ^ ^ ^ ^ j ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ i n d i n g s of F^t
 m the Proposed Findings and 
G^ 35fc1xi^ g^"-iiIi^ Bflie remiliSa(wlj|o and shall be revised to read as follows: 
j R i ^ ^ f t ^ ^ ^ S 8 ' 1 *** Wilkm$on property and the Babcock 
B^lav^w^ie^et'unknown or uncertain. 
^7A:^^^^^^^iadiag5 offsets in the Proposed Findings and 
'$8>l ^ P^feaW^^J^Fmdings of F^ ct in the Proposed Findmgs and 
CSi^ dsKHiy^Eaff^  if^Sffl^i^li 18 and shall 5© revised to read as follows: 
-2-
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Babeocks' predecessors did not interrupt the use of a portion of the 
Disrated Property by Wilkinson's predecessors. 
(e) Paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of Law in the Proposed Findings and 
Conclusions shall be revised to read as follows: 
Babeocks and" their predecessors, on the one hand, and Wilkinson and 
its-predecessors, on the other hand, knew or should have known that 
theboundary line between their respective properties was the True 
Borariary *nd knew of its location on the ground. The location on the 
^iurad^f tbe^ True Boundary was never uncertain or unknown to either 
^^a^^^il^^^decessors or Babcocks and their predecessors. 
^ l^i^^^^iA^^^^^nclus ions of Law in the Proposed Findings and 
C ^ f o s i ^ ^ B i B ^ y g # ^ ^ ^ p i • as follows: 
^ S S M f / ^ ^ ^ g i n of the Disputed Property was not objected to by 
With thefSi^g^^ Findings and Conclusions accurately set forth 
this Court^kiffi of Law, and defendants' counsel shall submit 
revised ^^^Bf^W&^^^^^^^P^ Law incorporating the changes outlined above 
and a Judgi^ Court does not intend by its changes to the 
ProposedJFkkli^ ^:t^^fuadns.Td^eate any implication that the Court has in any 
respect dp^ed^m^migOT WSof^/i& Findings of Faa and Conclusions of Law thar 
were ajt'cMhi^^ 
3:'?::" ^ f e ^ i ^ ^ ^ r t ^ i b m ^ forth above in paragraph 2 of this Order, 
plaintifT^Sie^ proposedTftistffogs of Fact and Conclusions of Law be and they 
are here^3den^^;g | |^ea; 
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4. Plaintiff s~ Objection to Memorandum of Costs dated April 6, 1998 be and the 
same is overruled. AH of the costs claimed in defendants' Memorandum of Costs herein 
dated March 26, 1998 are appropriate for recovery, and defendants should be awarded their 
costs in the amount of $829.50. Defendants' counsel is directed to submit to the Court for 
entry a Judgment containing an award of costs in that amount 
5. The time for any appeal of the Court's Judgment in this case shall run from 
the htcrM t h e ^ e ^ ^ f e ^ ^ V e g e ^ S this Order or the Judgment to be submitted as 
directed TOBis^Of^f; 
MJfDE 93*8 mSmmWsy^? day of October, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Michaap^Glasmann 
District Judee 
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NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: WILKINSON FAMILY FARM AND ITS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for defendants Babcocks will 
submit the foregoing to the Court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the 
date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection 
is filed prior to that tiffle, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this dav of September, 1998. 
Bruce A. Maak 
'Attorney for Defendants Babcocks 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . 
I HEREBY CERTIFY toat the foregoing Order was served this < 3 3 day of 
—Oeteber, 1998" by mailing on said date copies thereof by United States mail, first class 
postage pi^aid^ ^dressed to: 
Robert A. Echard, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2491 Washington Boulevard, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
MfelvenE. Smith, Esq. 
Smith, Knowles & Hamilton 
Attorneys for Defendants Babcock 
4723 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Kris Henriod, Secretary 
